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Toxic waste has become an increasing public health problem in
America.' Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act CCERCLA" or "the Ace) 2 in
1980, as a means to improve the efficiency of hazardous waste site
cleanups.3 CERCLA encourages parties to clean up toxic sites by
1. See United States v. Summit Equip. & Supplies, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (N.D.
Ohio 1992) (discussing the "'unfortunate human health and environmental' problems caused by
the improper disposal of hazardous substances" (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016(1), at 17
(1980))).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
3. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that
the purposes of CERCLA "include facilitating efficient responses to environmental harm,
holding responsible parties liable for the costs of the cleanup, and encouraging settlements that
reduce the inefficient expenditure of public funds on lengthy litigation) (citations omitted);
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) ("CERCLA addresse[s] this
problem 'by establishing a means of controlling and financing both governmental and private
1450 [Vol. 52:1449
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allowing those parties to recover response costs from potentially re-
sponsible parties (TRPs").4  To accomplish this goal, CERCLA con-
tains an expansive liability scheme that imposes strict liability on,
among others, a party that has released or threatened release of a
toxic substance that has caused or may cause the incurrence of re-
sponse costs. 5 Liability under CERCLA may be joint or several.6
CERCLA is notoriously ambiguous, leaving many questions
open to judicial interpretation.7 This Note, for instance, addresses the
issue of whether CERCLA's strict liability scheme includes a causa-
tion or minimum threshold of release element or defense. Courts and
commentators have taken different approaches and views on this
issue.8  While the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, the
question is significant because the burden of establishing liability
affects the speed and efficiency with which toxic waste sites are
cleaned.
responses to hazardous releases at abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites.'" (quoting Bulk
Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984))).
4. See Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 667 ("Section 9607(a) [the cost recovery provision], one of
CERCLA's key provisions for furthering this objective [of cleaning toxic waste sites], permits
both government and private plaintiffs to recover from responsible parties the costs incurred in
cleaning up and responding to hazardous substances at those sites.'); see also Kalamazoo River
Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l, 3 F. Supp.2d 799, 803 (W.D. Mich. 1998). A PRP is a party that
falls within the category of a covered person, including any present or past owner of a hazardous
waste site, a party who has arranged for disposal of waste at the site, or a party who has
transported waste to the site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1994). The liability scheme is
outlined in Part II, infra.
5. See Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 668 (detailing the elements of a CERCLA action under 42
U.S.C. § 9607).
6. An action brought as one for recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 carries joint and several
liability. See OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1579 (5th Cir.
1997). Joint liability is "1liability shared by two or more parties." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 926
(7th ed. 1999). Several liability is a party's liability that is "separate and distinct from another's
liability. Id. Some courts have allowed a party that would otherwise be jointly liable to demon-
strate that its actions were divisible. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-
2d), 990 F.2d 711, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing a divisibility defense and citing cases that
concur). An action brought by a responsible party against another party for contribution under
42 U.S.C. § 9613 carries only several liability. See OHM Remediation, 116 F.3d at 1580-82. For
a discussion of when courts permit actions for recovery or contribution, see generally Jason E.
Panzer, Apportioning CERCLA Liability: Cost Recovery or Contribution, Where Does a PRP
Stand?, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 437 (1996).
7. See Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 667 ("[B]ecause the final version was enacted as a 'last-
minute compromise' between three competing bills, it has 'acquired a well-deserved notoriety for
vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history."' (quoting
United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902, 905 (D.N.H. 1985))).
8. This issue is discussed more specifically infra in Parts 1H and IV. As a general
matter, a causation element or defense is based on the question of whether the defendant's
waste necessitated response costs. See cases cited infra note 90; see also infra note 40 (discuss-
ing the meaning of the causation element or defense). A minimum threshold of release element
or defense suggests that a court should not impose liability upon a defendant unless the defen-
dant has contributed a significant amount of a toxic substance. See Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 716.
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Those advocating a causation or minimum threshold of release
requirement argue that despite the absence of an explicit threshold
level in the Act, Congress did not intend to attach liability to a party
that has released only a de minimis amount of a toxic substance. 9
Others argue that the statute's plain language indicates that Con-
gress intended no causation requirement at the liability stage of a
CERCLA recovery or contribution action. 10 Courts' approaches to this
issue vary from refusing to impose a causation or threshold of release
standard," to allowing a defendant to raise the issue as an affirma-
tive defense, 2 to requiring a causation or minimum threshold of re-
lease element as part of a plaintiffs prima facie case.'
3
Confusion over the different approaches to this issue has in-
tensified because the courts have not adequately delineated between
single- and multi-polluter contexts. 4 This Note presents a Model for
understanding the cases based on this distinction. When the cases
are placed within this Model, the majority view becomes, and should
be, that in a multi-polluter context the plaintiff need not show causa-
tion or a minimum threshold of release to establish liability, but that
the defendant may raise this issue as an affirmative defense by dem-
onstrating that its release was divisible. In the single-polluter con-
text, however, this Note argues that requiring proof of causation to
establish liability advances the purpose of CERCLA.
This Note develops the argument by first providing an over-
view of CERCLA's liability provisions and the cost recovery process.
Part III traces the case law to demonstrate the confusion over the
minimum threshold and causation concepts. Part IV presents a
Model for understanding the confusing approaches, considered in
light of the single- and multi-polluter distinction, as consistent in
furthering CERCLA's objectives. Part V concludes that, although the
9. See cases cited infra note 41.
10. See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
11. See, e.g., A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (9th Cir.
1998) (explaining that while other courts have "imposed [these defenses] through the back door
.... it is not [the court's] function to read into the statute a limitation that Congress did not put
there').
12. See, e.g., Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 721-22 (allowing a defendant to raise the defenses at
the apportionment phase of litigation).
13. See, e.g., Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc. (Coaters I), 948 F. Supp. 128, 137 (D. Mass.
1996) (requiring causation and minimum threshold of release to be part of the plaintiffs prima
facie case).
14. The difference between these contexts and the implications on the causation defense
are discussed infra Part IV. See generally infra note 85 (distinguishing single-polluter cases
from multi-polluter cases).
[Vol. 52:14491452
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courts do not always follow this Note's Model, it is appropriately the
majority view.
H. CERCLA LIABILITY AND THE COST RECOVERY PROCESS
Congress intended CERCLA to further two important goals.
First, Congress intended CERCLA to shift the financial burden of
cleaning sites contaminated with toxic wastes from the taxpayers to
parties that contributed the waste.' 5  Second, Congress intended
CERCLA's liability scheme to encourage parties to clean hazardous
waste sites "expeditiously."16  CERCLA's liability scheme achieves
these goals by "cast[ing] a wide net"'7 of liability that covers parties
who would not be liable under traditional common law tort princi-
ples 18 and encouraging parties to settle early.
Two sections of CERCLA provide the statutory authority for a
party that has incurred response costs to recover those cleanup ex-
penses. A cost recovery action may be brought under 42 U.S.C. §
9607, and a contribution action may be plead pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
9613.19 Although both provisions impose strict liability,20 a party
15. See Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 716.
16. Id. at 723 (explaining that Congress intended the Act to "enable the EPA to respond
'efficiently and expeditiously' to environmental threats" with assurances that its expenses will
be recoverable (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992))).
17. United States v. Summit Equip. & Supplies, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1422, 1431 (N.D. Ohio
1992).
18. See Evan Bogart Westerfield, Comment, When Less is More: A Significant Risk
Threshold for CERCLA Liability, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 697-98 (1993). This is essentially the
issue addressed by this Note-that courts often impose liability without consideration of causa-
tion or a de minimis defense that a court would consider under common law tort principles.
19. Issues have arisen concerning which parties may bring a cost recovery action. If the
government performs the cleanup, it may bring a cost recovery action under § 9607 against
PRPs. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain Corp., 987 F.2d 1335, 1340 (8th Cir.
1993). Similarly, "innocent parties" who have incurred cleanup costs may bring a cost recovery
action. See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1994).
However, the courts are split over whether one PRP may bring a cost recovery action against
other PRPs. Some courts have held that allowing a PRP to plead under § 9607 is consistent
with both the purpose and plain language of CERCLA. See, e.g., Velsicol Chem. Corp. v.
ENENCO, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 1993); General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation
Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1417 (8th Cir. 1990). Other courts have held that a PRP may not
bring a cost recovery action because allowing the action would render the statutory provision for
contribution actions [§ 9613] superfluous. See, e.g., United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d
1530, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 1995) (considering an action by a PRP under CERCLA to be a claim for
contribution).
20. "Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though an
explicit provision for strict liability was not included in the [final compromise version of the
Act]. Section 9601(32) provides that 'liability' under CERCLA 'shall be construed to be the
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attempting to recover the costs of cleaning a toxic waste site would
prefer to file a cost recovery action because it imposes joint and sev-
eral liability while a contribution action imposes only several liabil-
ity.21 A successful plaintiff in a cost recovery action would therefore
be able to collect any orphan share of the response costs from any
responsible party.22 Further, CERCLA specifically recognizes only
three affirmative defenses that a defendant may raise to an action
plead pursuant to § 9607.23 Many courts have read the listing of these
defenses to exclude any other defense. 24 Contribution actions under §
9613 do not have statutorily defined defenses, so courts have been
more amenable to allowing other equitable defenses.25 A cost recovery
action, therefore, is preferable for the plaintiff both because of joint
liability and the restriction on defenses.
26
Courts often employ a bifurcated litigation process in CERCLA
cases.27 In the bifurcated process, liability is considered at the first
phase of the litigation. CERCLA intentionally sets a low bar for im-
posing liability because the early imposition of liability encourages
settlements and the efficient cleaning of waste sites.28 A plaintiff
generally must prove only four elements to establish liability.29 A
standard of liability' under.., the Clean Water Act, which courts have held to be strict liabil-
ity." New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f(2)-(3) (1994).
22. The orphan share is the residual amount of response costs after all PRPs have con-
tributed their liability to the cleanup. Joint liability in a cost recovery action has the effect of
holding any losing defendant responsible for the response costs associated with the defendant's
actions plus any orphan share.
23. The defenses are: (1) an act of God, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1), (2) an act of war, §
9607(b)(2), and (3) an act or omission of a third party unrelated to the defendant, § 9607(b)(3).
See also B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996) (listing the defenses to a cost
recovery action); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989) (also listing
the defenses to a cost recovery action).
24. See, e.g., Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 517 (using "[t]he canon of construction that says 'expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius' [which] cautions against creating additional exceptions to com-
plex statutory enactments").
25. See Panzer, supra note 6, at 452.
26. The split among circuits concerning whether a PRP may bring a cost recovery action is
one source of confusion about whether there is a threshold of release or causation element in a
CERCLA action. Arguably a contribution action, for practical purposes, must include a causa-
tion element at some phase of the litigation because the amount of contribution could not be
determined without establishing how much of the response costs the defendant caused. The
effect of allowing a PRP to bring a cost recovery action on the causation issue is beyond the
scope of this Note.
27. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-2d), 990 F.2d 711, 723 (2d Cir.
1993).
28. See id.
29. The Act explicitly establishes these elements for cost recovery actions only. However,
even courts that recognize a difference between recovery and contribution actions look to these
factors for both actions. See, e.g., Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain Corp., 987
1454
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plaintiff must prove that: (1) under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) the defendant
is a "covered person,"30 (2) the site of contamination is a covered facil-
ity,31 (3) the defendant has released or threatened to release3 2 a haz-
ardous material,33 and (4) the release or threatened release caused the
plaintiff to incur response costs.
34
After a court finds a PRP liable, the litigation proceeds to the
apportionment phase.35 Litigation costs at this stage are often high as
each side uses expert testimony to demonstrate the extent to which a
specific defendant's waste contaminated the site.36 To recover re-
sponse costs, a plaintiff must demonstrate at the apportionment stage
that the costs were incurred while acting in accordance with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan ('NCP").3 7  The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") has promulgated regulations implementing the
NCP,3 8 which is designed to compensate cost-effective action that
"adequately protects public health and the environment. ' 39
Through these various provisions, CERCLA provides a liability
scheme that shifts response costs from the government to private
parties and encourages expeditious cleaning of toxic sites. The liabil-
ity scheme uses a bifurcated process in which courts determine liabil-
ity at the first phase at a relatively low cost. Costs increase if parties
continue to the apportionment phase, in which any orphan share is
split between responsible parties.
F.2d 1335, 1340 (8th Cir. 1993) (considering the elements of a recovery action in a contribution
case); Premium Plastics v. LaSalle Nat'1 Bank, 904 F. Supp. 809, 814 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (same).
30. A covered person is a potentially responsible party described supra note 4.
31. 'The term 'facility' means (A) any building, structure... or (3) any site or area where
a hazardous substance has been deposited [or] stored... but does not include any consumer
product .... 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1994).
32. A "release," as defined in § 9601(22), is, among other activities, "any spilling [or] ...
discharging." For a discussion of what constitutes a release under CERCLA, see generally Craig
May, Note, Taking Action-Rejecting the Passive Disposal Theory of Prior Owner Liability
Under CERCLA, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 385 (1998).
33. Hazardous material is defined in § 9601(14) by cross reference to various other
statutes. Specifically, hazardous material includes any substance designated pursuant to or
listed in 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9602, 42 U.S.C. § 6921, 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a), or 42
U.S.C. § 7412.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-2d), 990 F.2d
711, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1993); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989)
(collecting cases); see also Westerfield, supra note 18, at 700.
35. See Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 723.
36. See Lisa C. Goodheart & Karen A. McQuire, Revisiting the Issue of Causation in
CERCLA Contribution Litigation, 82 MASS. L. REV. 315, 329 (1998) (discussing the difficulty of
tracing waste found at sites).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
38. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1988).
39. Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 672.
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III. COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF CAUSATION AND THRESHOLD OF
RELEASE AS ELEMENTS OR DEFENSES IN CERCLA ACTIONS
Parties defending CERCLA actions have primarily raised two
related defenses to liability after the plaintiff has established the
elements outlined in Part II. First, defendants have argued that the
plaintiff must demonstrate causation. 40  Second, defendants have
argued that they are not liable unless they contributed a certain level
of a hazardous substance-the minimum threshold of release de-
fense.
4 1
While the plain language of the Act and its legislative history
suggest that no causation or minimum threshold element exists at the
liability stage, many courts have had difficulty reconciling this inter-
pretation with their sense of fairness. 42 Courts have expressed frus-
tration that the language of CERCLA does not, in their opinion, per-
mit these defenses, and many courts have therefore interposed a
causation or threshold of release test.
43
Courts have primarily responded to this issue in four ways: (1)
allowing a defendant to raise causation and minimum threshold of
release as affirmative defenses at the apportionment stage, (2) al-
lowing a defendant to raise causation and minimum threshold of
release as affirmative defenses at the liability stage, (3) prohibiting a
causation or minimum threshold of release defense at any stage, and
40. The causation defense is generally phrased as either: whether the waste "caused"
response costs within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4), or whether the plaintiff can trace
the waste at the contaminated site to the defendant. For defendants arguing the former, see,
for example, Licciardi v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 111 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 1997), Amoco Oil,
889 F.2d at 670, and Town of Oyster Bay v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 987 F. Supp. 182
(E.D.N.Y. 1997). See also A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1107 (9th
Cir. 1998) (discussing the causation defense as a means to impose a minimum level of release
requirement in the Fifth Circuit). For defendants arguing the latter, see, for example, B.F.
Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996), Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 721, and Premium
Plastics v. LaSalle National Bank, 904 F. Supp. 809, 814-15 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
41. See, e.g., A & W Smelter, 146 F.3d at 1110; Licciardi, 111 F.3d at 399; Betkoski, 99
F.3d at 517; Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 716; Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 669; Kalamazoo River Study
Group v. Rockwell Int'l, 3 F. Supp.2d 799, 804 (W.D. Mich. 1998); Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc.
(Coaters II), 948 F. Supp. 128, 137-38 (D. Mass. 1996). Defendants raising this defense have
used several different terms to assert the same basic defense. The theory is that the defendant
has not released enough of the toxic substance to result in liability. Some courts have termed
this level "de minimis," see, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 769 F. Supp. 591, 594 n.1
(D. Del. 1991), others a "minimum concentration," see, e.g., Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 716, and
others a "threshold of significance," see, e.g., Coaters II, 948 F. Supp. at 138. The Coaters II
Court explained that the threshold of significance was a higher standard than a de minimis
standard. Coaters II, 948 F. Supp. at 138. For purposes of this Note, the distinction is irrele-
vant.
42. See infra Part III.C.
43. See infra Part III.A-B.
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(4) requiring a plaintiff to include causation and minimum threshold
of release as elements of the prima facie case. This Part of the Note
discusses the differences in these approaches to highlight the confu-
sion over the role of causation and minimum threshold issues in
CERCLA actions.
A. Causation and Threshold of Release as Affirmative
Defenses at the Apportionment Stage
In United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-2d), the
Second Circuit openly used a "backdoor" approach to allow a causa-
tion or minimum threshold defense at the apportionment stage of a
CERCLA cost recovery action.44 The government had cleaned a site in
New York that eighty-three parties had allegedly contaminated with
toxic waste.45 While eighty-two of the parties settled with the govern-
ment, Alcan refused to settle, and the government proceeded with a
CERCLA cost recovery action.
46
Alcan asserted in its motion to dismiss that CERCLA's liability
scheme implicitly included a minimum concentration requirement
and a causation element.47  The Second Circuit noted that the gov-
ernment had made its prima facie case by establishing the elements
listed in the cost recovery statute.48
44. Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 722 ("In [allowing a causation defense] we candidly admit that
causation is being brought back into the case-through the backdoor, after being denied entry at
the frontdoor-at the apportionment stage.').
45. The government in Alcan-2d was both the state of New York and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency. The two governments responded together to clean the
contaminated site in 1977 at a cost of over $12 million. See id. at 717.
46. See id. Alcan filed a third party complaint against Cornell University seeking contri-
bution. See id. Cornell maintained a stockpile of coal at its Ithaca, New York campus. See id.
When the coal caught fire in 1974, water used to extinguish the fire caused run-off that polluted
streams in the area. See id. Cornell agreed to neutralize the run-off and the EPA decided not to
prosecute a CERCLA action against Cornell. See id. The action against Alcan was based on
joint liability, so Alcan would bear not only its share but any orphan share left after the gov-
ernment settled with the other 82 defendants. Consequently, filing third party complaints
against other PRPs was clearly in Alcan's interest. Had Cornell actually reached a settlement
agreement, it would have been immune from a contribution action by another PRP. See 42
U.S.C. § 9613()(2) (1994) ("[A] person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a
State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims of
contribution.'). However, the court held that Cornell and the government did not reach a
settlement. See Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 724-25. Rather, the government exercised its prose-
cutorial discretion in deciding not to file suit against Cornell. See id.
47. See id. at 720 ("Alcan attempts to interpose a number of additional defenses to prevent
the imposition of liability. It argues that a polluter should not be held liable unless: a) the
concentration of hazardous substances in its wastes exceeds some minimum threshold; b) its
wastes fall within certain EPA reporting requirements; and c) its wastes caused the government
to incur response costs.').
48. See id. at 724-25.
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Specifically, the court held that the plain language of the cost
recovery statute did not impose a minimum quantity standard to
establish liability,49 and that the elements of a plaintiffs prima facie
case do not include causation.50 However, in what the court consid-
ered an effort to avoid unjust results, it allowed an affirmative de-
fense of causation at the apportionment stage.51 Thus, if a trial pro-
ceeds beyond the liability stage to the apportionment stage, a defen-
dant under Alcan-2d can avoid liability by showing that its portion of
the hazardous waste at issue was not greater than background con-
tamination and could not concentrate with other hazardous sub-
stances.52 The Second Circuit created this causation defense candidly,
recognizing the necessity of the defense in order to avoid what it
believed would otherwise be harsh results. 53
B. Causation and Threshold of Release as Affirmative
Defenses at the Liability Stage
The Fifth Circuit in Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc. established a
similar causation defense, although the court did so at the liability
stage rather than the apportionment stage.54 The Amoco Oil plaintiff
purchased a site from the defendant, discovered radioactive waste at
the site, and filed a declaratory judgment action arguing that the
defendant was liable for response costs. 55 The district court granted
judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff had not demon-
strated that a threshold level of radiation was present at the site.56
The Amoco Oil court, on appeal, first used a plain language analysis
to find that no threshold level of concentration is required for liability
49. See id. at 720 ('CThe statute on its face applies to 'any' hazardous substance, and it does
not impose quantitative requirements.').
50. See id. at 721 ("What is not required is that the government show that a specific
defendant's waste caused incurrence of clean-up costs . . . [because] 'including a causation
requirement makes superfluous the affirmative defenses provided in section 9607(b)."' (quoting
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985))).
51. See id. at 722. "Having rejected Alcan's proffered defenses to liability, one would
suppose there is no limit to the scope of CERCLA liability. To avoid such a harsh result courts
have added a common law gloss onto the statutory framework." Id. at 721.
52. See id. at 722.
53. See id. at 721.
54. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 1989).
55. Id. The defendant operated a phosphate fertilizer plant on the site before selling it to
the plaintiff. See id. A by-product of the manufacturing process is phosphogypsum which
contains low levels of radioactivity. See id. At the site, the defendant left other waste that was




to attach to a defendant under CERCLA.5 7 However, the Fifth Circuit
then held that a defendant will not be liable under CERCLA unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the contamination at the site posed
a threat to the public or the environment and therefore "caused the
incurrence of response costs" within the meaning of § 9607(a)(4). 58
The Amoco Oil causation requirement is similar to that in
Alcan-2d, but with the important distinction that the Amoco Oil court
allowed the defendant to raise the causation defense at the liability
stage, rather than the apportionment stage.59 The significance of this
distinction is discussed in Part IV.
C. Rejection of the Causation and Threshold of Release
Defenses at All Stages
The Ninth Circuit has declined to allow a causation or thresh-
old defense at any stage of a CERCLA action. In A & W Smelter and
Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, a landowner sought recovery of response
costs incurred while complying with a government order to remove
ore from a processing facility.60 The ore contained small amounts of
silver and gold along with trace amounts of lead. A & W based its
defense to the recovery action on the theory that the amount of lead
found in the waste was insufficient to warrant the government's
cleanup.6 1 The government moved for summary judgment, arguing
that CERCLA includes no minimum concentration requirement. 62
After considering the Second Circuit's opinion in Alcan-2d and the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Amoco Oil, the Ninth Circuit concluded that,
while those circuits have imposed a causation defense, the plain lan-
57. See id. at 669 ("[The plain statutory language fails to impose any quantitative re-
quirement on the term hazardous substance and we decline to imply that any is necessary.').
58. Id. at 670.
59. See id. at 669; supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. Also significant is that while
the Alcan-2d court explicitly recognized its willingness to allow causation to become an issue
through the "backdoor," Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 722, the Amoco Oil court created its rule without
noting the extent to which the defense altered the Act's express requirements.
60. A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1998).
Defendant A & W's processing facility, located in the Mojave Desert, included ore containing
hazardous lead. See id. The EPA directed A & W to dispose of the ore in an approved landfill.
See id. A & W disposed of the ore and then filed an action seeking reimbursement of its compli-
ance costs. See id.
61. A & W would have been entitled to reimbursement from the government if it were not
a PRP under the cost recovery provision, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Therefore, although this case was
brought under different circumstances than other CERCLA recovery actions, in that the plain-
tiff paid the response costs and then disputed whether the costs were appropriate, the analysis
is the same.
62. See A & W Smelter, 146 F.3d at 1110 (noting that "[i]t's not surprising that [the
government] would urge an interpretation which gives it such broad discretion").
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guage and legislative history of CERCLA led to the unavoidable con-
clusion that .the Act allows neither a minimum threshold level of
release nor a causation defense.
63
D. Causation and Threshold of Release as Part of the
Prima Facie Case
Not all courts have found that the statutory language and
legislative history of CERCLA prevents them from imposing either a
causation or minimum threshold requirement. 64  Perhaps the most
strongly articulated holdings in favor of causation and minimum
threshold requirements are found in Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc.
(Coaters 1)65 and Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc. (Coaters II).66 In Coat-
ers I, the plaintiffs were a group of PRPs that had settled with the
government and then sought contribution from other parties.67  One
defendant, New England Telephone and Telegraph Company
("NETT"), moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
68
The plaintiffs had established that they had incurred response costs
as a result of a chemical found in waste materials NETT had depos-
ited at the site.69 The plaintiffs believed the court would find liability
because they had established the elements for determining whether a
party is a PRP under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).70  Further, NETT did not
contest that the waste it had deposited contained the chemical creo-
sote, that creosote was present at the site, or that the response costs
were justified.
71
The Massachusetts District Court, however, held that a plain-
tiff must establish that the specific defendant's waste caused the
63. See id. at 1110-1111. "It is not [a court's] function to read into the statute a limitation
that Congress did not put there." Id. at 1111.
• 64. For instance, eight years after its decision in Amoco Oil, the Fifth Circuit interpreted
its prior decision to mean that CERCLA did impose a minimum level requirement for liability to
attach. See Licciardi v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 111 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 1997). In Farmland
Industries, Inc. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain Corp., the Eighth Circuit had no misgivings about
imposing a causation requirement, holding that the issue of liability is "inextricably linked to
causation." Farmland Indus. Inc. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain Corp., 987 F.2d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir.
1993).
65. Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc. (Coaters 1), 937 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1996).
66. Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc. (Coaters I1), 948 F. Supp. 128 (D. Mass. 1996).
67. Coaters I, 937 F. Supp. at 990.
68. See id.
69. NETT disposed of utility pole "butts" at the site. See id. Butts of NETT's poles
contained creosote, a liquid that prevents wood from rotting, but contains polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons ('PAHs"), the hazardous substance found at the site. See id.
70. See id. at 993.
71. See id. at 990.
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pollution that resulted in the response costs.7 2 The court concluded
that the strict liability scheme of CERCLA imposes liability without
fault, not liability without causation. 3 After examining the text of
CERCLA, the court determined that the Act implied that a plaintiff
must establish causation as part of the prima facie case.
74
In the second Coaters decision, the district court granted mo-
tions by a number of defendants for summary judgment based upon
the argument that their share of waste at the site was insufficient to
impose liability.7 5 Using an analysis similar to that in Coaters I, the
court held that a plaintiff must show that each individual defendant
contributed a "threshold of significance" amount of a toxic substance
to the site before liability will attach.7 6 In Coaters I and H the Massa-
chusetts District Court thus determined that a CERCLA plaintiff
must demonstrate, as part of its prima facie case, that the defendant
released a threshold amount of a toxic substance and that the par-
ticular defendant's waste caused contamination that required cleanup
costs.
7 7
E. Summary-What is the Standard?
At first glance, the only thing clear about the causation and
threshold of release issues in CERCLA actions is that many courts
72. See id. at 992. At trial, the defendant's expert witness testified that the toxic sub-
stance in defendant's waste could not have caused the pollution at the site. The court noted
that:
[NETT's expert testified that] PAHs used in creosote-treated utility pole
butts could not have leached into the surrounding soil to create a level of
PAHs in the soil greater than the pre-existing background levels of PAHs al-
ready in the soil. ... NETT's expert testified that even if NETT disposed of
creosote-treated utility pole butts at the Site, the butts could not have con-
tributed to any response costs incurred by the Plaintiffs.
Id. at 992.
73. See id. at 1000-01.
74. See id. at 993-96. While other courts held that the absence of an explicit causation
requirement or defense in § 9607 meant that one did not exist, the Coaters I court disagreed,
stating that "t]here are many requirements in CERCLA that, without a doubt, exist yet are not
stated in the plain language of [§ 9607].... Silence does not, itself, speak." Id. at 994.
75. Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc. (Coaters I), 948 F. Supp. 128, 138 (D. Mass. 1996).
76. Id. at 137. The Coaters 1I threshold of significance standard is not completely defined,
but the court rejected the plaintiffs contention that barely more than "a scintilla or de minimis
[release of a hazardous substance] is enough to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of
law." Id. at 138. This decision is completely at odds with the Ninth Circuit's holding in A & W
Smelter, discussed supra Part Il.C, which explicitly states "[t]he Second, Third and Fifth
Circuits have faced this very question and all agree that CERCLA's definition of hazardous
substance has no minimum level requirement. We see no basis for parting company." A & W
Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
77. Coaters II, 948 F. Supp. at 138; Coaters I, 937 F. Supp. at 933.
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disagree. The standard of liability seems to depend upon the location
of the waste site. The Second Circuit allowed a defendant to raise the
issues at the apportionment stage, but set the bar for a successful
defense very high.78 The Fifth Circuit allowed for a causation defense
at the liability stage.79 The Ninth Circuit would not allow the defense
at any stage,80 and the District of Massachusetts has read the same
language to require a plaintiff to show causation and a release that
passes a threshold of significance standard at the liability stage.81 The
availability of these issues as defenses or elements of the prima facie
case may significantly affect the cost and efficiency of toxic waste
cleanups; thus application of these concepts affects the fulfillment of
Congress's goals in enacting CERCLA.
IV. A SINGLE- AND MULTI-POLLUTER MODEL TO ADVANCE THE
PURPOSES OF CERCLA
Congress intended CERCLA's liability scheme to effectuate
two important goals. First, Congress intended CERCLA to shift the
financial burden for cleaning toxic waste sites from the taxpayers to
parties contributing waste.8 2 Second, Congress intended CERCLA's
liability scheme to encourage parties to clean hazardous waste sites
expeditiously.83 CERCLA advances these goals through joint and
several liability and the bifurcated judicial process that allows a
plaintiff to establish defendants' liability at an early stage without
extensive legal costs.8 4 Whether a causation or threshold of release
defense or element is appropriate, at what stage, and who should
carry the burden of proof, depends on the context in which the argu-
ment arises.
78. See supra Part III.A.
79. See supra Part ]II.B.
80. See supra Part III.C.
81. See supra Part III.D.
82. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-2d), 990 F.2d 711, 716 (2d Cir.
1993).
83. See id. at 723.
84. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667-68 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Bifurcation
and the use of summary judgment provide efficient approaches to these cases by narrowing the
issues at each phase, by avoiding remedial questions if no liability attaches, and by potentially
hastening remedial action or settlement discussions once liability is determined.").
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A. A Model Based on the Differences Between the Single-
and Multi-Polluter Contexts
CERCLA cases arise in two contexts-single-polluter and
multi-polluter. 85 The Model presented here will demonstrate that
CERCLA's liability scheme advances Congress's purposes in different
ways depending on whether an action arises in the single- or multi-
polluter context. The considerations behind allowing a causation or
minimum threshold defense or element in a CERCLA action depend
on the context in which the case arises. In the multi-polluter context,
this Model will show that attaching liability without requiring proof of
causation advances CERCLA's purposes. A court should, however,
allow a defendant in a multi-polluter action to raise an affirmative
defense at the apportionment stage that its waste could not have
caused the incurrence of response costs. 86 This will increase the speed
and ease with which a party can establish liability, which will encour-
age early settlements and improve the efficacy of the clean-up proc-
ess. In the single-polluter context, this Model suggests that courts
should require a plaintiff to make a minimal showing at the liability
stage that the defendant's release caused response costs. This will
protect against parties using CERCLA's broad liabilty scheme when
response costs are not warranted.
Many of the CERCLA cases that initially appeared inconsis-
tent become consistent when viewed in light of this Model.87 Those
cases that fall outside the Model often fail to distinguish between the
single- and multi-polluter contexts or do not recognize the most effec-
85. As the titles suggest, in the single-polluter context, the plaintiff alleges that one party
polluted the site, and in the multi-polluter context, the plaintiff alleges that multiple parties
contributed a hazardous substance to the site. The single-polluter/multi-polluter determination
is made irrespective of the number of defendants named in the complaint. In a multi-polluter
case, for example, all but one party may have settled, so the plaintiff may have only named one
party in the complaint. Some courts have recognized differences between the two contexts, with
the most articulate discussion found in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-3d),
stating that the distinction between single- and multi-polluter cases "is significant for, in the
multi-generator context, the fact that the response costs were justified would not per force
signify that each generator's waste caused the release and the resultant response costs." United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp (Alcan-3d), 964 F.2d 252, 266 (3d Cir. 1992).
86. For instance, the court in A & W Smelter discussed the possibility that without a de
minimis standard, liability could be imposed on anyone who throws out a lemon or drops an old
nickel. A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998); see
also Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 716 (discussing defendant's view that without a de minimis defense,
"breakfast cereal, the soil, and nearly everything else upon which life depends" would be
considered a hazardous substance leading to liability).
87. See discussion infra Parts IV.B and IV.C.
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tive means to further CERCLA's purposes. This Model explains the
tension between many cases that initially appear inconsistent.
B. Advancing CERCLA's Purposes in the Multi-Polluter Context
In the multi-polluter context, attaching liability to defendants,
even if the plaintiff has not established causation or that the defen-
dant contributed any significant level of hazardous waste to the site,
best serves CERCLA's purpose. Reducing the burden for plaintiffs to
establish liability furthers CERCLA's goals in two ways. First, im-
posing liability without proof of causation or a threshold amount of
release reduces the risk that the government will be responsible for
unrecoverable response costs.8 8 Second, easing the plaintiffs burden
of proof and minimizing litigation costs at the liability phase encour-
age parties to expeditiously clean toxic waste sites. Reduced litigation
costs for plaintiffs encourage PRPs to settle, which in turn speeds the
clean-up process.89 A discussion of the reasoning of courts that have
faced multi-polluter cases illustrates these advantages and demon-
strates why allowing a limited causation defense furthers congres-
sional objectives.
1. The Meaning of Causation and Threshold of Release
in the Multi-Polluter Context
The causation and minimum threshold of release arguments
have different meanings in the multi-polluter context than in the
single-polluter context, and this distinction is important for under-
standing CERCLA's liability scheme in light of Congress's objectives.
In multi-polluter cases, the causation and minimum threshold de-
fenses constitute two distinct arguments. The causation argument
asserts that liability should attach to the defendant only if the plain-
tiff can show that the particular defendant's waste necessitated the
incurrence of response costs.90 This essentially requires the plaintiff
to trace the course of each defendant's waste.91 On the other hand, a
88. See infra Part IV.B.2.
89. See infra Part IV.B.3.
90. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering a
defendant's argument that the plaintiff must demonstrate the particular defendant's waste
caused incurrence of response costs); Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 721; Farmland Indus., Inc. v.
Morrison-Quirk Grain Corp., 987 F.2d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1993); Kalamazoo River Study Group
v. Rockwell Int'l, 3 F. Supp.2d 799, 804 (W.D. Mich. 1998); Town of Oyster Bay v. Occidental
Chem. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 182, 194-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc. (Coaters
1), 937 F. Supp. 988, 992 (D. Mass. 1996).
91. See Kalamazoo, 3 F. Supp.2d at 804.
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defendant employing the minimum threshold of release defense ar-
gues that even if the plaintiff can trace waste at the site to the defen-
dant, the court should not impose liability unless the defendant has
contributed a threshold amount of a toxic substance.
92
2. Refusing to Consider Causation or Minimum Threshold of Release
Arguments at the Liability Phase Advances CERCLA's Purpose of
Shifting Response Costs to Private Parties
Congress intended CERCLA to shift toxic waste site response
costs from the government to private parties.9 3 A minimum threshold
defense at the liability stage could frustrate Congress's purpose by
allowing multiple parties, each of whom may have only contributed a
small amount of waste, to escape liability despite the potential for
small amounts of waste, when aggregated, to result in sizable cleanup
costs. In this scenario, each polluter may avoid liability, leaving the
government with response costs, contrary to Congress's intention.
The Second Circuit has addressed these concerns.9 4 In Alcan-
2d, the defendant argued that liability should not attach without
proof that the defendant contributed a threshold level of a hazardous
substance.9 5 The defendant contended that if no minimum level of
concentration were required, then liability would attach to parties
Congress did not intend to reach through CERCLA.96 For instance,
because breakfast cereal contains iron, a hazardous substance, a
party who disposed of cereal at a site that later required response
costs could be held jointly and severally liable for those costs.
9 7
92. Note that in this argument the defendant is not claiming that response costs are
unwarranted. Rather, the defendant claims that its contribution of waste was not significant
enough to trigger liability. See, e.g., Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 716 (discussing the defendant's
argument that liability should not exist "unless a responsible party has contributed some




96. See id. It is unclear whether the court accepted the defendant's contention that
Congress did not intend to impose liability on parties who dispose of minimal amounts of
substances not ordinarily considered hazardous. Compare id. at 716 (noting that if these parties
were allowed to escape liability "simply by relying on the low concentration of hazardous
substances in [their] wastes,... the government would be left to absorb the clean-up costs"),
with id. at 717 (permitting a causation defense that "is not intended to provide an escape hatch
for CERCLA defendants; rather, it will permit such a defendant to avoid liability only when its
pollutants contribute no more than background contamination").
97. The court stated that:
Alcan and a host of amicus briefs have presented us with a parade of horri-
bles predicated on their view that [without a minimum concentration re-
quirement], hazardous substances include breakfast cereal, the soil, and
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The Alcan-2d court recognized the ramifications of this argu-
ment, but held that the government's position better represented
congressional intent underlying CERCLA.98 The government argued
that if parties could avoid liability based on a low concentration of
hazardous substances in its waste, then in a multi-polluter context all
polluters could potentially raise this defense to avoid liability.99 This
conclusion would leave the government responsible for clean-up costs,
contrary to congressional intent.00 The court observed that rejection
of a de minimis defense reflected Congress's desire to place the inter-
ests of taxpayers before the interests of generators of hazardous sub-
stances.' 0 '
3. Refusing to Consider Causation or Threshold of Release
Arguments at the Liability Phase Advances CERCLA's
Purpose of Encouraging the Expeditious and Efficient
Cleaning of Toxic Waste Sites
Congress intended CERCLA to encourage the expeditious
cleaning of waste sites.10 2  CERCLA accomplishes this goal by pro-
moting settlement of disputes, which expedites the cleaning process
simply by allowing the cleanup to begin before the parties completely
litigate the matter.0 3 Decreased litigation costs result in expeditious
nearly everything else upon which life depends, and that such an approach
will make liable for response costs the butcher, the baker and the candlestick
maker. They posit that to avoid such an absurd result, liability under
[CERCLA] should not be imposed unless a responsible party has contributed
some minimum concentration of a hazardous element or compound.
Id. at 716 (citation omitted). For a similar argument, see A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v.
Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) ("A & W asks us to read a minimum level require-
ment into the statute and regulations. It argues that trace levels of hazardous substances are
present just about everywhere. Read as the EPA suggests, CERCLA seems to give the agency
cart blanche to hold liable anyone who disposes of just about anything. Drop an old nickel that
actually contains nickel? A CERCLA violation. Throw out an old lemon? It's full of citric acid,
another hazardous substance.!).
98. See Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 716.
99. See id.
100. See id. In this situation, multiple parties release de minimis amounts of a hazardous
substance and the site becomes contaminated to the point that it requires response costs.
However, since no party released waste sufficient to be held liable, the government must absorb
the costs.
101. See id. at 716-17 ("In passing CERCLA Congress faced the unenviable choice of
enacting a legislative scheme that would be somewhat unfair to generators of hazardous
substances or one that would unfairly burden the taxpaying public.... There may be unfairness
in the legislative plan, but we think Congress imposed responsibility on generators of hazardous
substance advisedly. And, even were it not advisedly, we still must take the statute as it is.').
102. See id. at 723.
103. See B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 527 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[CERCLA] strengthens
the federal policy of encouraging CERCLA settlements. Elsewhere the Act specifically asks that
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cleaning because parties will begin cleaning before liability is estab-
lished, confident that they will receive reimbursement for a portion of
their costs.
10 4
CERCLA grants a party settling with the government immu-
nity from suits for contribution and from joint liability, encouraging
early settlements and promoting expeditious cleanup. 10 5 A party's
failure to settle with the government could result not only in the
imposition of liability for the share of recovery costs resulting from
that party's own conduct, but also for any orphan share. This provi-
sion encourages a party in a multi-polluter case to settle with the
government. 106
CERCLA's liability scheme also promotes settlements through
a bifurcated litigation process. 10 7 Litigation costs in a CERCLA action
that proceed through both the liability and apportionment phases are
extremely high due in part to the complex nature of the action and the
expert testimony required. 0 8  By allowing plaintiffs to establish li-
ability at the first phase, without considering causation, the litigation
costs are higher in the second phase of the process. A plaintiff could,
therefore, establish the liability of parties at a low cost, providing
PRPs with an incentive to settle.
the government enter into CERCLA settlements 'in order to expedite effective remedial actions
and minimize litigation.' [42 U.S.C.] § 9622(a). Courts considering CERCLA cases have recog-
nized that the usual federal policy favoring settlements is even stronger in the CERCLA con-
text.').
104. See United States v. Summit Equip. & Supplies, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (N.D.
Ohio 1992) (quoting a House Report that explains that Congress intended CERCLA's broad
reaching liability scheme to encourage private parties to respond voluntarily).
105. "A person who has resolved its liability to the United States under this subsection
shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement."
42 U.S.C. § 9622(h)(4) (1994). See also Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 527.
106. See Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 527; see also Goodheart & McQuire, supra note 36, at 322. A
hypothetical situation demonstrates the ability of CERCLA to promote cleanup by encouraging
settlement. If the government planned to clean a toxic waste site that it alleges was contami-
nated by ten different parties, each of whom contributed the same amount of the same hazard-
ous substance, all parties should contribute the same amount to the government. If, however,
one of the parties is insolvent, the other nine will bear responsibility for the remaining orphan
share because the government may always bring a cost recovery action, which imposes joint
liability. Seven of the parties then settle with the government to pay just less than one tenth
each. The parties that have not settled, if they lose in court, will be responsible to pay the
government not only for their one tenth share, but also the orphan shares left from the insol-
vent party and the amount left from the seven parties that paid less than their share. Further,
the two parties that had their day in court cannot seek contribution from the parties that settled
despite their having settled for less than their fair share. Parties in multi-polluter cases thus
have incentive to settle, resulting in expeditious cleanup.
107. See Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 720 ('The existence of [the bifurcated process] aids Congress'
purpose by encouraging settlement discussions and speeding up remedial action.').
108. See Goodheart & McQuire, supra note 36, at 332.
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B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski is an example of a multi-polluter
case in which the court refused to allow proof of causation as a de-
fense at the liability phase. In Betkoski, the Second Circuit reversed
the trial court's decision to dismiss a CERCLA claim against over
1,000 PRPs. 10 9 The trial court granted summary judgment for most of
the defendants in part because the plaintiffs had not demonstrated
that the particular defendants' waste caused the cleanup costs. 110 The
Betkoski court held this was an error and reversed, emphasizing that
a plaintiff need not show that a specific defendant's waste caused the
response costs."' The court held that summary judgment in the
plaintiffs favor is appropriate when the plaintiffs make their prima
facie case and the defendants do not assert any statutory defenses."12
Causation is not one of the statutory defenses, and therefore the
Betkoski court refused to allow causation arguments at the liability
stage. 13
The Betkoski holding is consistent with the purpose of
CERCLA and the Model presented in this Note. If the court had
allowed causation to become an issue at the liability stage, both sides
would have incurred large costs in expert testimony early in the proc-
ess. Experts have difficulty tracing the path of hazardous wastes, and
therefore establishing that a specific defendant's waste caused the
response costs is a difficult and expensive task. 1 4 The requirement of
proof of causation at the liability stage would front-load litigation
costs. This would discourage settlements because plaintiffs would
have more difficulty establishing liability, and therefore lessen the
likelihood of efficient responses to environmental harms.
109. See Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 528-29. This case involved two landfills in Connecticut that
were listed as superfund sites by the EPA. See id. at 511. Coalitions of PRPs at each site
settled with the EPA and agreed to clean the sites. See id. at 512. The coalitions then sought
contribution from non-settling parties. See id.
110. See id. at 516.
111. See id. at 517 ("[Ihe trial court's reading of CERCIA is inconsistent with the Act's
language .... Moreover, if we required a plaintiff to show more than a release or threatened
release, we essentially would be asking the plaintiffs to prove that a specific defendant's hazard-
ous substances caused the release of a hazardous substance. No causation is needed, however,
to establish liability under CERCLA.").
112. See id. at 514 ("Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, a defendant may avoid
liability only if it establishes... that the release or threatened release was caused by an act of
God, an act of war, certain acts or omissions of third parties other than those with whom the
defendant has a contractual relationship, or a combination of these reasons.').
113. See id. at 516 ("Independent releasability is not required to establish liability.").
114. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-3d), 964 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir.
1992) ("Congress deleted the causation language from CERCLA precisely because it was aware
of the difficulties plaintiffs would confront in the multi-generator context if required to prove
such a connection.'); see also Goodheart & McQuire, supra note 36, at 322.
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4. Allowing Limited Causation or Threshold of Release Arguments at
the Apportionment Phase Prevents Absurd Results
Courts should allow a defendant to raise causation or thresh-
old release arguments at the apportionment stage to avoid absurd
results. Imposing joint and several liability on the person who throws
away cereal at a site already contaminated by several industrial fa-
cilities does not further Congress's purpose. 15 An affirmative defense
is therefore appropriate at the apportionment stage. The Second
Circuit took this approach in both Alcan-2d"
6 and Betkoski. 7
The court in Alcan-2d held that while a defendant could not
raise a minimum concentration defense at the liability stage, the
defense is available at the second stage of the process-the appor-
tionment stage."" At the apportionment stage, a defendant may avoid
liability by demonstrating that the defendant's release, when mixed
with other hazardous waste at the site, did not contribute to the re-
sponse costs, or at most contributed to only a divisible portion of the
harm. 119 The Betkoski court echoed this approach by holding that if
one PRP can show that its release is divisible, it may avoid joint and
several liability.
120
A minimum threshold defense at the apportionment stage is
consistent with the purpose of CERCLA in the multi-polluter context.
This approach allows a plaintiff to establish liability quickly and at a
low cost, which in turn encourages rapid cleanup and minimizes
litigation at the outset, yet also allows a defendant to raise a narrow
affirmative defense that its waste is divisible in order to avoid unjust
results.
115. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-2d), 990 F.2d 711, 716 (2d Cir.
1993).
116. See id. at 723.
117. See Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 514.
118. See Alcan-2d, 990 F.2d at 722.
119. See id. "We hasten to add nonetheless that causation-with the burden on defen-
dant-is reintroduced only to permit a defendant to escape payment where its pollutants did not
contribute more than background contamination and also cannot concentrate." Id.
120. See Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 517 ("It follows logically that a defendant who disposes of
hazardous substances that are not independently releasable may still be held liable, even
though that defendant may not be required to pay damages when the cost apportionment phase
of the litigation is reached.!).
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C. Advancing CERCLA's Purposes in the Single-Polluter
Context by Considering the Causation or Threshold of
Release Arguments at the Liability Phase
Unlike the multi-polluter context, delaying the causation or
minimum threshold argument until the apportionment stage does not
further CERCLA's purpose in the single-polluter context because
these defenses have a different meaning in the single-polluter context.
In the multi-polluter context, these defenses are predicated on one of
two theories: first, that imposing liability on a defendant for contrib-
uting a minimum amount of toxic substance to a heavily contami-
nated site is unfair;121 and second, that the plaintiff should have to
demonstrate that the defendant's waste was the particular waste that
contaminated the site, not the waste of another PRP.122 In the single-
polluter context, however, both of these defenses are based on the
theory that even if the defendant released all of the waste at the site,
the waste is not significant enough to warrant response costs.
23
In the single-polluter context, refusing to consider the causa-
tion or threshold of release defense until the apportionment stage
does not advance CERCLA's purpose. Because the defense in these
cases is that no response was necessary, the issue is best decided at
the outset. Encouraging expeditious cleanup of sites that do not
require a response clearly does not further CERCLA's purposes.
24
Regulations implementing CERCLA provide guidelines for the level of
toxicity that must exist at a site in order to justify response costs.
125
If toxicity levels were not an issue at the liability phase, then defen-
dants could be exposed to harassing and frivolous litigation as parties
could threaten suit and easily establish liability even if the site did
not require the party to incur response costs.
26
121. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
122. See Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l, 3 F. Supp.2d 799, 804 (W.D. Mich.
1998).
123. See, e.g., A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir.
1998) (addressing the argument that a party should not have to bear response costs when there
is not enough of a hazardous substance at a site to make the site hazardous); Licciardi v.
Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 111 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 1997); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889
F.2d 664, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1989).
124. CERCLA's liability scheme only provides compensation for response costs incurred
consistent with the NCP. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994).
125. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1988).
126. See Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 670 ('The only concern that should support the use of a
quantitative measure at the liability phase is potential abuse of the broad provisions, which may
subject some defendants to harassing litigation.).
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Courts should, however, set a low bar to establish that a
cleanup is warranted for purposes of establishing liability. A low
standard would encourage parties to err on the side of cleaning sites
that may warrant a response, thereby ensuring that those sites that
do require response costs are cleaned expeditiously.
In Amoco Oil, a case arising in the single-polluter context, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff must dem-
onstrate the release of a quantitative threshold of a hazardous sub-
stance in order to establish liability.127 The Fifth Circuit first exam-
ined the text of CERCLA's cost recovery provision and held that it did
not impose a minimum level of release requirement.128 The court then
rejected the plaintiffs theory of CERCLA liability-a theory identical
to that later adopted by the Second Circuit in Alcan-2d.129 The Amoco
Oil plaintiff argued that liability should attach regardless of the
amount of hazardous substance at the site, and that the defendant
could argue at the apportionment phase that it owed no contribu-
tion.130 The court held instead that liability would not attach unless
the release of the hazardous substance "caused the incurrence of
response costs."'131
The Amoco Oil court set a low bar for plaintiffs to establish
that a release of a hazardous substance caused the incurrence of
response costs. The court held that to establish liability a plaintiff
need only show that a release has or may violate the most stringent
state or federal standard, even if a violation of that standard would
not constitute recoverable costs in accordance with the NCP.132 The
court could then consider the recoverability of costs at the apportion-
ment stage, in which the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that
response costs were warranted.133
127. Id. at 668-69.
128. See id.
129. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-2d), 990 F.2d 711, 720-21 (2d Cir.
1993).
130. See Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 670 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that "CERCLA liability
attaches upon the release of any quantity of a hazardous substance and that the extent of a
release should be considered only at the remedial phase").
131. Id.
132. See id. at 671. "In the absence of any specific direction from Congress, we believe that
the question of whether a release has caused the incurrence of response costs should rest upon a
factual inquiry into the circumstances of a case and the relevant factual inquiry should focus on
whether the particular hazard justified any response actions.... [W]e hold that a plaintiff who
has incurred response costs meets the liability requirement as a matter of law if it is shown that
any release violates, or any threatened release is likely to violate, any applicable state or federal




In Licciardi v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., another single-polluter
case, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the proposition that liability will not
attach simply "upon release of any quantity of a hazardous sub-
stance.'1 34 In Licciardi, the court did not even discuss the proposition
that the statutory language does not impose any quantitative re-
quirement, as the court had in Amoco Oil. Instead, the court simply
stated that a plaintiff must establish that the particular hazard justi-
fied response costs at the liability stage.
135
Amoco Oil and Licciardi are consistent with CERCLA's pur-
pose because the Fifth Circuit considered the causation element only
as a threshold for whether to apply CERCLA's liability scheme. When
response costs are not justified, the court need not continue with the
process, but when response costs are required, and the only question
before the court is which party should bear the costs, casting a wide
liability net furthers CERCLA's purposes. In these cases, because
only one party is alleged to have released toxic substances, the issue
is not who should bear the costs but whether costs are necessary at
all. However, Congress intended that CERCLA's liability scheme be
broad enough to ensure that all toxic sites will be cleaned expedi-
tiously.1 3 6 Accordingly, Amoco Oil and Licciardi do not require that a
plaintiff establish that response costs are justified and recoverable
under the NCP at the liability stage.137 Rather, the cases hold that a
plaintiff need only show that the release or threatened release vio-
lates or threatens to violate the most stringent state or federal stan-
dards, even though that standard is not as stringent as the NCP
standard.
38
By requiring some causation and minimum threshold showing
at the liability stage, Amoco Oil and Licciardi appear on the surface
to be inconsistent with Alcan-2d and Betkoski, where the Second
Circuit allowed a causation or minimum threshold of release defense
at the apportionment phase rather than at the liability phase. How-
ever, in light of the distinction between single- and multi-polluter
contexts and the ways in which courts may effectuate congressional
objectives based on this distinction, these cases are consistent both
with each other and with CERCLA's purpose.
134. Licciardi v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 111 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Amoco
Oil, 889 F.2d at 670). The Licciardi plaintiff was a Louisiana landowner seeking cost recovery,
pursuant to § 107, from a nearby oil refinery. Id. at 397.
135. See id.
136. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992).
137. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
138. See Licciardi, 111 F.3d at 398; Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 671.
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D. Cases Outside the Model
Recognizing the competing policy considerations of the de-
fenses in the single- and multi-polluter contexts explains many courts'
holdings that initially appear inconsistent. Further, the Model pro-
vides a framework for how future courts should resolve the current
tension among the circuits. However, this Note's Model for under-
standing causation and minimum threshold of release in CERCLA
actions is unable to reconcile the holdings of all courts on the ques-
tion.
1. A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton
In A & W Smelter, the Ninth Circuit examined a single-
polluter case and held that CERCLA's liability scheme did not permit
a defendant to assert a causation or threshold defense at any phase of
CERCLA litigation.139 Under the Model, the Ninth Circuit should
have followed Amoco Oil and required a minimum showing that re-
sponse costs were appropriate at the liability phase. While defen-
dants in the single-polluter context may argue that the waste at the
site is insufficient to warrant response costs, the A & W Smelter court
used a textual analysis to hold that no minimum threshold or causa-
tion defense exists under CERCLA. 140 The court also considered the
Amoco Oil holding and responded to the Fifth Circuit's decision to
allow a causation defense by stating that "[w]here a party is responsi-
ble for a particular release, that party is a cause of any response to
that release."'141 This argument simply changes the meaning of the
word "cause." It overlooks the Amoco Oil court's decision to find that
a party caused response costs only where the costs are justified under
the NCP. Congress did not intend CERCLA to require parties to
reimburse response costs unwarranted by the NCP.4 2  A & W
Smelter's holding is contrary to congressional intent in that it finds
causation any time a party's conduct leads to response costs, even
when those costs are not justified. This holding could lead to harass-
ing litigation in which liability is established even though no response
costs are necessary.43 Imposing CERCLA's liability scheme in this
139. See A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998).
140. Id. at 1110-11.
141. Id. at 1111.
142. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
143. See Amoco Oil. 889 F.2d at 670.
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situation is inappropriate because it does not encourage cleanup of
the toxic sites CERCLA was designed to regulate.
144
2. The Coaters Decisions
Recent commentary has focused on the Coaters decisions,
another line of cases that falls outside the Model. 145 In Coaters I and
II, the District Court of Massachusetts used a textual argument to
impose a threshold level of release and causation requirement at the
liability stage of a multi-polluter case. 46 This holding is inconsistent
with Congress's purpose in enacting CERCLA and this Note's Model,
which suggests that a court dealing with a multi-polluter case should
only consider causation or minimum threshold of release issues at the
apportionment phase. The Coaters court analyzed the language and
legislative history of CERCLA in a manner that is at odds with other
courts. 47 The Coaters court found that, despite the absence of a cau-
sation or a threshold level of release defense or element in the Act,
those elements formulated part of a plaintiffs prima facie case under
CERCLA.
148
Commentators have discussed multiple shortcomings of the
Coaters analysis, 149 but the most significant criticism relevant here is
the district court's belief that its decision is consistent with Alcan-2d.
The court correctly noted that Alcan-2d allowed a causation defense,
and therefore asserted that the only difference was the burden of
proof. 50 This assertion is incorrect. 151 Alcan-2d makes the causation
and minimum threshold defenses very difficult for defendants to
establish, and allows those defenses only at the apportionment stage,
making plaintiffs proof of liabilty very easy.152 The Coaters decisions,
144. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
145. See generally Goodheart & McQuire, supra note 36.
146. See supra Part III.D.
147. See supra Part If[.E.
148. See supra notes 74, 76 and accompanying text. The debate among other courts
considering the language and legislative history of CERCLA concerned whether causation or a
minimum threshold could be raised as an affirmative defense-whether they needed to be part
of a plaintiffs prima facie case was not even considered. See supra Part III.
149. See generally Goodheart & McQuire, supra note 36.
150. See Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc. (Coaters 1), 937 F. Supp. 988, 998-99 (D. Mass. 1996).
151. The Coaters I court made the analogy to both Alcan-3d and Alcan-2d. The analogy to
Alcan-3d is more readily justifiable. In that case, the court considered divisibility at the liability
stage. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-3d), 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992). The
analogy is not strong, however, as Alcan-3d merely considered whether the release was divisi-
ble, not whether the plaintiff had established that a particular defendant's waste could be traced
to the site. See id.
152. See supra Part III.A.
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on the other hand, place the burden on the plaintiff at the liability
phase to prove that the defendant's conduct resulted in response
costs. This distinction is significant because enabling plaintiffs to
establish liability with ease results in the expeditious cleaning of
waste sites, behavior Congress sought to encourage by enacting
CERCLA. If other courts followed Coaters, parties would be less
inclined to settle, litigation costs would be high, and cleanups would
be delayed, thereby frustrating Congress's purpose.
153
3. Kalamazoo and the Confusion of the Single- and
Multi-Polluter Contexts
Besides Coaters, other courts have frustrated CERCLA's pur-
pose by failing to distinguish between the single- and multi-polluter
cases and by relying on holdings based on different contexts. The
District Court for the Western District of Michigan decided Kalama-
zoo River Study Group v. Rockwell International,,4 a multi-polluter
case, the same year the Ninth Circuit decided A & W Smelter. In
Kalamazoo, the court followed the Coaters decisions, holding for two
defendants at the liability stage of a CERCLA action.155 Consistent
with this Note's Model, the court first recognized that the case fell
within the multi-polluter context, and therefore that plaintiff need not
demonstrate that each defendant's waste caused the response costs at
the site. 1 6 However, the court then held that a plaintiff must show
that the defendants had released a threshold amount of a toxic sub-
stance. 57  While the Kalamazoo court's imposition of a minimum
threshold requirement at the liability phase of a multi-polluter case is
itself disturbing, even more disturbing is its reliance on the Fifth
Circuit's decisions in Amoco Oil and Licciardi for the proposition that
the plaintiff must demonstrate a minimum level of release as part of
the prima facie case. 58 Amoco Oil and Licciardi involved single pol-
luters, while Kalamazoo arose in a multi-polluter context. In Amoco
153. See Goodheart & McQuire, supra note 36, at 332-35.
154. Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l, 3 F. Supp.2d. 799 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
In this case, the settling parties initiated an action against other parties they alleged to have
contributed hazardous substances to the site. See id. at 802.
155. Id. at 814.
156. See id. at 804.
157. See id. at 807.
158. See id. at 805. 'The Fifth Circuit has not based liability on the release of a minimum
quantity of hazardous substances, but it has required a release sufficient to justify response
costs." Id. This statement is flawed both because it cites cases arising in a single-polluter
context, and because it considers causation and threshold of release as though they have
different meanings in the single-polluter context.
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Oil and Licciardi, the Fifth Circuit advanced CERCLA's purpose by
allowing a causation or minimum threshold of release defense at the
liability phase, while the Kalamazoo court hindered CERCLA's objec-
tive of promoting efficient cleaning of waste sites by making the plain-
tiffs prima facie case more difficult to establish.
4. Summary
The causation aspect of CERCLA often confuses courts for two
reasons. First, courts use the same language in both the single- and
multi-polluter contexts even though causation has different meanings
in the two contexts. Because the contexts differ, and therefore the
defenses differ, courts can advance CERCLA's purpose in some cases
by requiring some form of causation at the liability stage while ad-
vancing CERCLA's purpose in other cases by requiring some form of
causation at the apportionment phase. While courts have generally
come to the conclusion that furthers CERCLA's purpose, since they
often come to the proper conclusion without explaining the distinction
between the single- and multi-polluter contexts, many of their deci-
sions seem inconsistent. Second, the causation element often con-
fuses courts because not all courts recognize Congress's objectives in
enacting CERCLA, especially in light of the single- and multi-polluter
contexts. Consequently, many courts confuse the issue further by
following cases from the wrong context.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts deciding CERCLA cases have failed to recognize that
the difference between single- and multi-polluter contexts determines
the best method to advance CERCLA's purpose. The courts have
confused the causation and threshold of release defenses, and have
not adequately considered how the defenses differ depending on the
context. When the cases dealing with these issues are considered in
light of the significance of the single- and multi-polluter contexts,
many cases that initially appear inconsistent can be reconciled with
other cases as well as congressional intent underlying CERCLA. The
confusion among the courts in these cases is attributable to the loose
use of language in which the term "causation" takes on different
meanings. Cases that fall outside the Model have not recognized the
difference between single- and multi-polluter contexts and the atten-
dant implications upon the causation and threshold of release de-
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fenses. Such cases fail to interpret CERCLA in a manner consistent
with Congress's objectives.
This Note's Model advances CERCLA's purposes by recogniz-
ing the importance of the single- and multi-polluter contexts and
candidly applying a different standard depending on the context. In
the multi-polluter context, the Model provides that a court should find
liability without considering causation or a minimum threshold of
release. This establishes liability at a low cost, leading to the quick
and efficient cleanup of toxic sites, consistent with Congress's purpose
in enacting CERCLA. The necessity of incurring response costs is not
an issue in these cases, and the ease with which parties can establish
liability encourages settlements and speeds the remediation process.
However, to avoid holding parties liable for contribution of only a
minimal amount of a toxic substance at a site, the Model allows a
limited threshold of release defense at the apportionment stage.
In the single-polluter context, on the other hand, courts may
accomplish the same goals while considering causation at the liability
stage. In the single-polluter context, the causation defense challenges
the necessity of response costs and imposes liability only when re-
sponse costs are warranted. If response costs are unwarranted, then
the imposition of liability does not advance Congress's purpose. This
Note thus advocates a causation defense at the liability phase in
single-polluter cases.
The level of difficulty and expense involved in establishing
CERCLA liability has a serious impact on the speed with which the
government and private parties are able to clean toxic waste sites.
The causation and minimum threshold issues, if considered at the
liability stage, would significantly increase those costs. Increased
litigation costs at the liability phase may be justified in the single-
polluter context when the issue is whether a site was sufficiently
contaminated to invoke CERCLA's liability scheme at all. However,
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high litigation costs would frustrate Congress's purpose in passing
CERCLA in the multi-polluter context by delaying the cleanup proc-
ess. As courts continue to grapple with the confusing case law on this
subject, they should treat single- and multi-polluter contexts differ-
ently in order to best promote CERCLA's objectives.
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